



   
CHAPTER 6 
GROWTH, TRADE, AND THE                      
ENVIRONMENT NEXUS IN CHILE: 
A COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT 
JOHN BEGHIN, BRAD BOWLAND, SÉBASTIEN DESSUS,                             
DAVID ROLAND-HOLST, AND  
DOMINIQUE VAN DER MENSBRUGGHE 
1. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter is a synthesis of two studies of the interface between growth, 
trade, and the environment in Chile. Our two investigations complement earlier 
analyses of the trade-environment nexus in Latin America, which focused on the 
potential emergence of pollution havens (Birdsall and Wheeler 1992), and re-
cent environmental studies of Chile, which centre on urban air pollution with 
little or no linkage to trade orientation (O’Ryan 1994; Sanchez 1992; The 
World Bank 1994; O’Ryan and Sanchez 2001). Our first study focuses on pollu-
tion emissions and natural resource use; our second study takes the pollution 
emissions a step further and analyses the implications of the trade-environment 
interface for ambient pollution in Santiago and public health and damages.
1 The 
two studies rely on the methodology presented in the first part of the book 
(Chapters 3 and 4). In addition, the investigation of the health implications and 
their valuation is based on Chapter 5.  
The Chilean computable general equilibrium (CGE) model comprises 75 
sectors. The environment is characterised by pollution emissions linked to eco-
nomic activity, natural resource use, and public health implications of urban air 
pollution. The model incorporates 13 measures of pollution effluents, which are 
linked to the use of polluting inputs and energy use. We derive health implica-
tions for six measures of ambient pollution in Santiago using numerous mortal-
ity and morbidity measures.  
Because its topology, local climate, and economic concentration make this 
urban area comparable to Mexico City, Mexico, and Jakarta, Indonesia, pollu-
tion in Santiago poses a major and lasting environmental challenge to Chilean 
policymakers. A second motivation for the Chilean study is to make more tangi-
ble the linkages between economic, environmental, and public health indicators, 
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building upon recent work on urban pollution and health in Santiago (The 
World Bank 1994; Ostro et al. 1995; O’Ryan 1994, Comision National del Me-
dio Ambiente 1998). This is an essential step in support of policy formulation 
that takes more explicit account of economy-environment linkages and assesses 
direct and immediate personal costs of environmental degradation. We quantify 
the incremental mortality and morbidity associated with combined economic 
and environmental policies and their monetary damages. 
The Chilean case study is also interesting because it considers several trade 
integration scenarios via regional agreements and unilateral liberalisation. Re-
gional agreements induce different patterns  of specialisation from unilateral 
trade liberalisation and hence different pollution and environmental patterns as 
well. Specifically, we consider trade integration scenarios by way of Chile’s 
accession to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Com-
mon Market of the Southern Cone of South America (MERCOSUR), and uni-
lateral opening to world markets.  
We find that emissions of small particulates less than 10 micrograms in size 
(PM-10), sulphur dioxide (SO2), and (NO2) have the strongest impact on local 
mortality and morbidity. These three pollutants appear to be complementary in 
economic activity. For several types of emissions, accession to NAFTA appears 
to be environmentally benign. NAFTA participation, relative to unilateral trade 
liberalisation, provides a reduction in environmental damages, an unintended 
benefit from trade diversion, which reduces the reliance on cheap energy under 
free trade. Integration through unilateral liberalisation has a negative effect on 
the environment and upon urban morbidity and mortality. Damages from rising 
morbidity and mortality are substantial. Integration based on unilateral trade 
liberalisation induces damages equal to 8 per cent of the income gains arising 
from the trade integration. Unilateral trade integration combined with a tax on 
small particulates brings welfare gains that are about 16 per cent higher than 
those obtained under unilateral trade reform alone. 
Finally, our results, with some qualifications, strongly support the existence 
of a double-dividend conjecture on joint environment and efficiency gains. Tax-
ing air pollutants while reducing trade distortions and maintaining revenue neu-
trality induces net welfare gains from both reduced health damages and a more 
efficient allocation of resources by markets. Hence, reducing pollution by swap-
ping pollution taxes for trade taxes would pay for itself in Chile.  
Until 1975, Chile represented a textbook case of import substitution, replete 
with trade distortions, slow growth, foreign exchange restrictions, and resulting 
misallocation of resources. Following a series of policy reforms under the struc-
tural adjustment of the 1980s, Chile has become a thriving outward-oriented 
economy (Papageorgiou, Choksi, and Michaely 1990; The World Bank 1994).
2 
Growth of output and exports has been spectacular in natural resource based 
industries such as agriculture, fisheries, forestry, and mining sectors in which 
Chile has traditionally been competitive. These expansions have fostered rising 
living standards and concerns for the environmental consequences of the re-




Urbanisation is already well advanced in Chile, where about 85 per cent of 
the population live in or within the vicinity of major cities (for example, the 
Santiago metropolitan area and Valparaiso). The income growth and rapid ur-
banisation have outpaced the development of infrastructures such as paved 
roads, public transportation equipment, and sewage treatment systems. Several 
environmental problems in urban areas are linked to the poor road infrastructure 
and the use of untreated wastewater used in irrigated agriculture (The World 
Bank 1994). 
The infrastructure problem exacerbates air pollution in Santiago by contrib-
uting to emissions of suspended particulates and other effluents in the air. This 
problem combined with unique topological and climatic conditions (thermic 
inversion) puts Santiago in the league of the most polluted cities in the world.
3 
Rising income and health concerns are at odds with this situation. With the as-
sistance of international organisations, Chile started addressing these environ-
mental problems in the early 1990s, especially, air and water pollution in Santi-
ago and the depletion of forest resources (see The World Bank 1994; Comision 
National del Medio Ambiente 1998; and O’Ryan and Sanchez 2001). 
Next, we present a non-technical summary of the unique features of the Chil-
ean model, namely the added health module and valuation of the health impact of 
pollution. Then we describe the results of various trade scenarios. We stress the 
implications for natural resource use, emissions, and ambient pollution in Santiago 
and the associated health impacts.  
2. THE TEQUILA MODEL FOR THE CHILEAN STUDY 
The Trade and Environment Equilibrium Analysis (TEQUILA) model presented 
in Chapter 3 is tailored for this investigation. Natural sectors are represented by 
five agricultural sectors, forestry, fisheries, and five mining and extraction 
sectors. Their linkages to manufacturing are captured by twelve agricultural 
processing sectors, four wood-based sectors, four oil-based chemical industries, 
and eight mineral-based industries.  
Trade is modelled assuming goods are differentiated with respect to region of 
origin and destination. The disaggregation of trade flows allows us to analyse 
NAFTA and MERCOSUR scenarios. On the import side, we account for the 
heterogeneity of imports and domestic goods with the constant-elasticity-of-
substitution (CES) specification attributed to Armington. We assume a constant-
elasticity-of-transformation (CET) specification for domestic output, in which 
producers are assumed to differentiate between the domestic and export markets. 
We assume that Chile is a small country with two exceptions. We assume that 
copper and fishmeal exporters face a finite demand with an own-price elasticity 
of -5. Trade distortions are expressed as ad valorem tariffs. This assumption is 
consistent with the recent tariffication of most trade distortions in Chile 
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As in the other investigations presented in this book, a vector of 13 measures 
of various water, air, and soil effluents characterises pollution by sector. The 
intensities vary by sector and with relative prices since the use of “dirty” inputs 
is influenced by relative price changes induced by policy intervention. The 13 
pollution measures include toxic pollutants in water, air, and land (TOXAIR, 
TOXWAT, TOXSOL); bio-accumulative toxic metals in air, soil, and water 
(BIOAIR, BIOWAT, BIOSOL); air pollutants such  as SO2, NO2, carbon 
monoxide (CO), volatile organic compounds (VOC), and particulate intensity 
(PART); and, finally, water pollution measured by biological oxygen demand 
(BOD) and total suspended solids (TSS). 
The model maps the predicted national pollution emissions from our simula-
tions into health effects for residents in Santiago and then into monetary dam-
ages corresponding to health impacts of pollution. In characterising emissions 
we use inventory baseline information on major air pollutants and emission 
sources. This step involves collecting existing information on pollutants known 
to cause significant health problems in Santiago, the corresponding emission 
sources, and baseline average annual emissions and ambient concentration lev-
els. The data are used to estimate the portion of emissions for the whole econ-
omy attributable to Santiago as well as to calibrate the health module of the 
economy-wide model to initial conditions. 
Dispersion modelling maps the effluent emissions into ambient concentration 
levels. We pay extra attention to two major air pollutants that bear significantly 
on our results: PM-10 and lead. For PM-10, recent ambient concentration data 
for Santiago indicate significant reductions since the early 1990s. We therefore 
assume that policy will have a significant impact on particulate emissions over 
the scenario period, in particular, that the sectoral emission coefficients will de-
cline at a rate of 3 per cent per annum to 2010. For lead, we apply the regulation 
on lead content of gasoline in Santiago of 0.18 grams per litre, which was effec-
tive from 1995, to base-year gasoline consumption in order to estimate motor 
vehicle related lead emissions. Then we allocate the lead emissions not a c-
counted for by gasoline in the base year to other sectors in accordance with the 
U.S. coefficients, constraining total Santiago emissions to yield the average am-
bient concentration of 1.5 milligrams per cubic metre given the dispersion func-
tion. Chile intends to phase down leaded gasoline use over time; therefore, we 
incorporate a 75 per cent reduction in the transport sector emission coefficient 
for lead for the period to 2010. Despite these assumptions, lead emissions grow 
significantly in the baseline. This is caused by the high-income elasticity of de-
mand for transport services and also by the growth of lead-emitting industrial 
sectors. The non-transport sector emission coefficients are kept constant at their 
base-year values, given that we do not make conjectures on policy initiatives 
relating to lead sources other than gasoline combustion. 
Population-weighted concentration levels are then used to determine expo-




response of human resources to changes in concentrations of air pollutants. 
Dose-response functions express the change in incidence of mortality/morbidity 
induced by changes in pollution concentrations (Ostro et al. 1995). The figures 
on health endpoints presented in the results section have to be interpreted as the 
increase/decrease in mortality and morbidity with respect to the business-as-
usual (BAU) levels of mortality and morbidity. We look at various morbidity 
and mortality incidences: premature mortality due to PM-10, SO2, and ozone; 
premature mortality in males of age 40-59 years due to lead; respiratory hospital 
admissions (for PM-10, ozone); emergency room visits (for PM-10); restricted 
activity days (for PM-10); lower respiratory illness for children population of 
age under 17 years (PM-10); asthma symptoms for asthmatic population (for 
PM-10, ozone); respiratory symptoms (for PM-10, ozone); chronic bronchitis in 
population of age 25 years or older (for PM-10); minor restricted activity days 
(for ozone); respiratory symptoms in children population (for SO2); chest dis-
comfort in adult population (for SO2); respiratory symptoms in adult population 
(for NO2); eye irritation in adult population (for ozone); number of headaches in 
adult population (for CO); IQ decrement in children population (for lead); cases 
of hypertension in adult male population (for lead); and non-fatal heart attacks in 
male population age 40-59 (for lead). 
The last step is to attach a monetary value to these health impact figures. 
We follow the willingness-to-pay approach to value morbidity and loss of life 
due to a change in mortality, as presented in detail in Chapter 5. We rely on 
the large body of information and data on such willingness-to-pay measures 
for industrialised economies to estimate these damages. Damages due to mor-
tality are based on the value of a statistical life, which indicates the aggregate 
valuation by individuals of reducing the risk of dying (see Chapter 5 and 
Bowland and Beghin 2001). 
Our estimates of willingness-to-pay measures for morbidity are less 
sophisticated because o f the scarcity of estimates available per measure of 
morbidity in industrialised countries. Hence, the procedure followed for 
mortality is ruled out. The available estimates from industrialised countries are 
scaled down to reflect the per capita income differences between Chile and these 
industrialised countries, expressed in purchase-power-parity 1992 dollars. 
3. POLICY REFORM SCENARIOS  
The time horizon of the simulations is the period 1992-2010 but with the policy 
reforms starting in 2000. Every year, savings determine the pool of new 
investment for the next period and the model solves for equilibrium for the year. 
This equilibrium determines savings going towards the new investment pool for 
the subsequent period. Each period, the sectoral resource allocation adjusts to 
new prices. Labour moves freely across sectors; existing capital is reallocated 
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into the model. The endogenous variables of interest, which adjust at every 
period, are sectoral output and input use, consumption, trade, pollution 
emissions associated with production and consumption, and aggregate real 
income, which serves as an approximate gauge of welfare or market efficiency.  
As in the other studies, we define a BAU trajectory for the economy until 
2010. Factor and energy productivity changes are endogenously determined 
such that the gross domestic product (GDP) forecast and the model are 
consistent with each other. All policies are held constant in this reference BAU 
scenario. For the years 1992 to 2010, the model gives us BAU trajectories for 
output, absorption, trade, and pollution emissions. All reported results are 
expressed in deviations (in percentages) from this BAU scenario and for 2010, 
which is the final year of the simulation exercise. 
The first reform scenario imposes taxes on pollutants one at a time. Each tax 
is such that the emissions of the targeted pollutant progressively decrease over 
time and reach a 25 per cent decrease relative to their level in the BAU results 
by 2010. The taxes are imposed on inputs and are proportional to the effluent 
content of the inputs. These taxes are phased in such as to obtain gradual 
reductions, culminating in a 25 per cent decrease in 2010. The tax rates per unit 
of effluent are the shadow prices of the quantitative constraints on the pollution 
emissions. 
The second scenario considers gradual trade integration, combining 
unilateral trade liberalisation through tariff reductions with a concurrent but 
modest improvement in terms of trade. Terms of trade are parametric for Chile, 
assumed to be a small country, and the terms-of-trade improvement is 
introduced as an exogenous shock. We assume that export prices increase to 
simulate this improvement that should result  from the integration of trading 
countries. This is equivalent to an improvement in the terms of trade. We 
decrease the ad valorem tariffs progressively to free trade, i.e., from their 
reference levels in 2000 to no tariff in 2010. Terms-of-trade improvements are 
expressed as a progressive increase in observed world prices for exports by 10 
per cent in 2010. The terms-of-trade assumption allows us to see how the 
environment is affected by an outward-oriented growth strategy.  
We consider analogous regional integration and liberalisation scenarios with 
NAFTA and MERCOSUR countries. Disaggregated data on trade flows allow 
us to consider these alternative trade-liberalisation scenarios. In these two other 
trade scenarios, we remove tariffs and increase export prices following a similar 
progression as in the previous scenario, but only with respect to trading partners 
that are members of these two regional agreements. Our objective is to impose a 
sizable trade shock on the Chilean economy in order to estimate changes in 
sectoral composition of production and trade. These changes determine the 
pollution emitted and induced by the outward trade orientation. 
As in the other country case studies, the last group of reform scenarios 




to investigate the implications of coordinated trade and environment policies. 
The differences in the incentive structures lead one to expect contrasting 
results concerning the indirect abatement or exacerbation achieved through 
complementarity or substitution among emission types, which occurs under 
the two scenarios.  
 
4. RESULTS FROM POLICY REFORM SIMULATIONS 
Results follow the sequence of the three reform scenarios: environmental tax 
reform, trade integration  (unilateral, NAFTA, and MERCOSUR), and then 
combined trade integration and environmental protection. In this section, we 
narrate salient results of the simulations in aggregate. Tables 1, 5, and 9 show 
the impact of the three policy reform scenarios on aggregate indicators. Tables 
2, 6, and 10 sequentially show the effects of the three scenarios on pollution 
emissions for the economy and for Santiago. Tables 3, 7, and 11 show how pol-
lution in Santiago affects the health status of its population for the three scenar-
ios respectively. Tables 4, 8, and 12 show the estimated valuation of the three 
scenarios’ health impact. 
4.1. Effluent Taxes 
All effluent taxes but the one on BIOAIR have a negative impact on growth. 
These effects are small (less than 1 per cent), except for the tax on toxic emis-
sions, BOD emissions, and BIOWAT emissions, which have a larger impact in 
absolute value (Table 1). The pollution tax on BIOAIR has a very small positive 
impact on real GDP. Hence, the strong tendency towards a reduction of aggre-
gate output with budget-neutral environmental taxes indicates that these policy 
reforms “do not pay” for themselves in the narrow efficiency sense (Goulder 
1995). The effects of these taxes on other aggregate measures of economic ac-
tivity tend to be small as well, with the same exception of the tax on BIOWAT. 
With the latter, trade decreases by about 9 per cent and investment decreases by 
23 per cent. The moderate aggregate output effect of the environmental taxes 
dissimulates substantial variations at the disaggregated sectoral level and reallo-
cation of resources across sectors. 
Next we look at noticeable sectoral output effects, i.e., substantial changes in 
output occurring in some of the 72 disaggregated sectors included in the model 
(not presented  in the tables). For the first four taxes (all three toxics and 
BIOAIR), fish and seafood output increases significantly but mining activities 
decrease sharply. The tax on BIOWAT has a negative effect on virtually all sec-
tors, and it has an especially strong effect on iron, coal, and basic metals. Ag-
gregate trade contracts with the effluent taxes. At the disaggregated sectoral lev-
els, trade effects are mixed. Importing is a way to abate pollution occurring in 
Table 1.  Impact of  environmental policy reform on aggregate variables (percentage)  
  Aggregate Abatement of 25 Per Cent by Type of Effluent Emission 
Aggregate  
Variables  TOXAIR  TOXWAT  TOXSOL  BIOAIR  BIOWAT  BIOSOL  SO2  NO2  CO  VOC  PART  BOD  TSS 
   
Real GDP  -1.91   -2.09   -1.92   0.03   -7.61   -0.42   -0.20   -0.19   -0.07   -0.45   -0.18   -1.91  -0.01  
Production  -2.90   -3.24   -2.82   -0.44   -7.63   -0.73   -2.03   -2.00   -0.70   -2.70   -1.81   -2.81  -0.12  
Consumption  -1.28   -1.58   -1.28   -0.18   -1.27   0.15   -0.99   -0.97   -0.13   -1.69   -0.60   -1.31  0.05  
Investment  -5.70   -6.25   -5.68   -0.09   -23.39   -1.25   -1.36   -1.32   -0.54   -2.04   -1.32   -5.66  -0.08  
Exports  -3.81   -4.35   -3.79   1.13   -9.57   -0.63   -3.37   -3.31   -0.78   -2.04   -2.43   -3.82  -0.01  
Imports  -1.82   -2.37   -1.91   1.36   -9.12   0.72   -3.54   -3.46   -0.76   -1.78   -2.44   -1.98  0.03  
Labour supply  -0.78   -0.81   -0.77   0.08   -2.78   -0.28   0.35   0.32   0.07   -0.09   0.20   -0.76  -0.02  
Capital  
supply 
-2.43   -2.69   -2.44   -0.03   -9.69   -0.50   -0.51   -0.49   -0.21   -0.64   -0.51   -2.44  -0.04  
Real income  -1.45   -1.77   -1.46   -0.17   -1.18   0.18   -0.95   -0.94   -0.12   -1.96   -0.58   -1.48  0.05  























production, and exporting reduces the pollution linked to consumption. These 
sectoral effects are moderate.  
As indicated in Table 2, pollution abatement induced by each effluent tax is 
diverse. Strong complementarities are observed in several subsets of the 13 ef-
fluent types, despite the clear possibility of substitution among pollution emis-
sions implied by our model, given that we do not impose any fixed proportions 
between output and emissions. An increase in the tax on one effluent induces a 
decrease in another effluent level. This is the case for the following subgroups: 
all toxics, BIOWAT and BIOSOL, and SO2, NO2, and PART (PM-10). More 
intriguing is the presence, in the aggregate, of substitution possibilities among 
effluents. For example, SO2 and NO2 are substitutes for TSS. 
The tax rates implied by the targeted decrease in emissions are realistic when 
expressed in an ad valorem equivalent of the producer price. On average, the 
pollution tax per unit of sectoral output is 4 per cent or less for all 13 scenarios. 
The individual tax rates (per sector and by effluent) vary from zero to less than 
15 per cent for all 13 scenarios, except for the scenario targeting reductions in 
VOC. In the latter scenario, the pollution tax rate on wine and liquors and on 
furniture products jumps above 50 and 35 per cent, respectively. These high 
rates are caused by the fact that these two sectors account for most of the VOC 
pollution in production. 
In the decomposition of the abatement, the composition effect is overwhelm-
ing both in the abatement in production and in consumption. The effect is more 
substantial in production than in consumption, because imports substitute for 
domestic output in pollution-intensive sectors. The technical effect in production 
is moderate, and the scale effect is marginal for most pollutants, except in the 
case of the BIOWAT tax (with a production scale effect of -8.1 per cent). 
The impact of the effluent taxes on the effluent concentration in Santiago is 
diverse and generally follows the complementarity patterns observed for emis-
sions. Table 2 shows that taxes on VOC, SO2, NO2, and PART (PM-10) provide 
significant decreases in lead (between 6 and 7 per cent). The taxes on BIOAIR 
and BIOWAT also decrease lead concentrations (by 11.4 and 5.3 per cent re-
spectively). The tax on BIOWAT has negative and sometimes large effects on 
other concentrations as well—it has the largest negative scale effects among the 
effluent taxes. Air pollution taxes also produce similar concentration patterns. 
Emission taxes on either NO2, SO2, or PM-10 lead to a substantial decrease in 
the concentrations of the other two and some decrease in CO. Taxes on CO and 
VOC also achieve substantial decreases in concentration in Santiago through a 
reduction of energy use and through a reduction in ozone. The other taxes have a 
marginal impact on most of the concentrations. 
In Table 3, the health endpoint changes are striking for the taxes on SO2, 
NO2, and PM-10. Premature mortality reductions are between 15 and 22 per 
cent. With these three taxes, most endpoints show improvements, with decreases 
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 Table 4 presents the health damage reductions induced by each environ-
mental tax. The tax on PART (PM-10) induces a decrease in monetary damages 
equivalent to 0.69 per cent of the BAU 2010 GDP; taxes on SO2 and NO2 re-
duce damages by an amount equivalent to about 0.50 per cent of BAU 2010 
GDP. The latter taxes induce net gains, as approximated by the loss of aggregate 
income plus the reduction in damages; this is also true of the tax on BIOAIR. 
The estimated welfare gains are lower-bound estimates because the decreases in 
morbidity and mortality are applied only to Santiago’s population. Hence, we 
find evidence of a net welfare gain (a double dividend) when accounting for 
health damages. These gains are rather small, in part because we only value 
health benefits for a subset of the Chilean population. The gains are conditioned 
on the various assumptions built into the model. 
4.2. Trade Integration 
According to Table 5, unilateral integration with world markets induces the 
largest increase in real GDP (4.86 per cent), followed by regional integration via 
NAFTA (1.4 per cent) and MERCOSUR (0.52 per cent). These gains are small, 
representing the relative gains over 10 years. These small changes originate in 
the outward orientation Chile has been following; large gains from liberalisation 
have already occurred. Nevertheless, these reforms have significant positive 
impacts on aggregate trade and aggregate gross investment. 
Moving to disaggregated sectoral output effects, the three trade reforms ex-
hibit sharp contrast. The unilateral trade reform stimulates the output of fruit, 
forestry, iron, other mining, food processing, wood products, paper, and petro-
leum refining. Conversely, petroleum and gas production, chemicals, copper, 
fishmeal, glass, and other manufacturing contract with undistorted trade. With 
NAFTA integration, fruit, agricultural services, other mining, food processing 
except fishmeal, and wine and liquor would expand significantly, whereas cop-
per, iron, and paper would decrease. Hence, NAFTA integration departs signifi-
cantly from integration with all partners in terms of international specialisation. 
MERCOSUR integration does not induce any strong effect, except for a major 
increase in food processing other than fishmeal, an increase in transportation 
material, and a decrease in iron and copper production. 
The trade effects of these reforms are as follows. The unilateral reform in-
duces major increases in virtually all sectoral imports and exports, except for 
imports of chemicals, glass, and other manufacturing and exports of fishmeal 
and copper. NAFTA integration has a smaller effect on trade than does unilat-
eral reform. There are noticeable export increases for food processing, wine, and 
textile and apparel, and decreases for iron, copper, forestry, and fishmeal. Im-
ports of agriculture, livestock, forestry, mining sectors, and wood products ex-
pand as well. Finally, the MERCOSUR integration induces increases in imports 
of agricultural products, iron, oils, sugar, tobacco, petroleum refining, and met- 
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Table 5. Impact of trade policy reform on aggregate variables (percentage) 
  Trade Policy Reform
a 
Aggregate 
Variables  Unilateral  NAFTA  MERCOSUR 
   
Real GDP  4.86  1.40  0.52 
Production  6.42  1.38  0.89 
Consumption  8.87  2.25  0.87 
Investment  16.50  4.24  1.66 
Exports  17.68  3.61  2.99 
Imports  29.27  6.21  4.48 
Labour supply  1.56  0.82  0.20 
Capital supply  6.27  1.63  0.64 
Real income  9.28  2.43  0.92 
Absorption  8.66  1.95  1.09 
a Reflects unilateral trade integration, NAFTA integration and 
MERCOSUR integration by 2010 with no explicit environmental 
policy reforms.  
 
als; imports of fish would decrease. On the export side, substantial reductions 
occur in exports of fishmeal, iron, copper, and seafood, but food processing, 
chemicals, plastics, and printing expand significantly. The endogenous world 
price assumption for fishmeal and copper accentuates the contraction of these 
two industries that already occurred under the small-country assumption. 
Table 6 shows the contrasting pollution implications of these trade reforms. 
Unilateral integration is pollution intensive; for example, NO2, SO2, and PM-10 
have elasticity with respect to GDP between 3 and 4 under this scenario. In con-
trast, NAFTA has elasticity values around 2 and 2.1, respectively, for the same 
effluents. The moderate expansion of pollution under MERCOSUR is matched 
by a moderate GDP expansion resulting in an air pollution intensive integration. 
However, MERCOSUR and unilateral integrations bring a decrease in BIOAIR 
induced by cheaper imports of natural gas. The trade diversion of NAFTA inte-
gration mitigates emissions relative to the other two trade integration scenarios. 
This is an unexpected, if not overlooked, insight on trade diversion in the pres-
ence of externalities. The NAFTA scenario produces strong composition effects 
in production, outweighing the scale expansion induced by NAFTA. In contrast, 
the unilateral integration relative to all partners induces higher intensities in SO2, 
NO2, and PART (PM-10) via strong technical effects towards pollution-
intensive input combinations. In addition to large increases in SO2, NO2, and 
PART, unilateral integration brings increases for all toxics, BIOWAT, CO, 
VOC, BOD, and TSS (Table 6). These increases are observed after 10 years of 







For the health endpoints in Santiago, the unilateral integration scenario has 
negative consequences for both mortality and all measures of morbidity as 
shown in Table 7. Premature mortality due to PM-10, ozone, and SO2 increases 
by 15 per cent and premature death in males of age 40-59 due to lead increases 
marginally. Morbidity increases are significant except for IQ decrements, hyper-
tension, and non-fatal heart attacks. NAFTA and MERCOSUR induce marginal 
increases in the health endpoints. The damages associated with the health inci-
dences are substantial for the unilateral trade integration. As suggested by Table 
8, the damages represent about 8 per cent of the aggregate income gains induced 
by trade integration (damages as a percentage of gains in GDP). By contrast the 
damages under the NAFTA scenario are moderate given the small deterioration 
of the average health status in Santiago. 154  BEGHIN ET AL. 
 
 
4.3. Coordinated Trade Integration and Environmental Protection  
We first combine NAFTA integration and effluent taxes on air pollutants. Then, 
we consider unilateral trade integration coordinated with an effluent tax on one 
pollutant at a time. The effluent taxes are designed as in the first set of scenarios 
on environmental reforms, that is, incremental and leading to a 25 per cent de-
crease in emissions of the taxed effluent with respect to their BAU levels. The 
tax rates corresponding to these reforms are slightly higher than in the environ-
mental reforms alone. The average tax rates on pollution, expressed in percent-
age of the producer price per unit of output, do not exceed 6 per cent. With trade 
integration, the pollution expansion requires higher tax rates than those reached 
under the environmental reform alone, in order to go back to a pollution level 






these higher rates, substitution/complementarity relationships between pollutant 
types are exacerbated. 
Table 9 shows that the aggregate effect of the combined reforms (NAFTA 
cum effluent tax) is small in general, but it is positive on real GDP in all cases. 
This positive real income effect suggests that with this larger policy menu (trade 
and environmental distortions) the environmental reform pays for itself, even 
before accounting for the associated health benefits. The aggregate effects also 
differ according to the pollutant considered. For example, the effluent tax on CO 
has a positive effect on aggregate measures, whereas the tax on VOC has a nega-
tive impact on production and absorption. As shown in Table 10, most of the 
pollution abatement figures, including the multiplier effects of the tax on pollut-
ants that are not directly targeted by the tax, are similar to the abatement figures 
obtained under the environmental reforms alone. The indirect abatement of the 
pollutants other than the targeted one does not have to occur because changing 
border prices affect specialisation and hence pollution. This result is due to the 
fact that NAFTA integration has a mitigated impact on the Chilean environment.  
According to Table 9, the impact of coordinated unilateral trade integration 
with environmental taxes appears almost additive on real GDP, trade, and con-
sumption. This is a recurrent result in this type of simulation exercise (see Chap-
ter 10). Aggregate trade expands less under the coordinated reforms than under 
the simple unilateral trade integration, although some sectoral imports induced 
by the latter reform grow even more under the coordinated scenario because 
imports are a way to abate pollution. For instance, fish imports are larger under 
the combined scenario than under the unilateral trade integration alone.  
The inventory of emissions duplicates several patterns reached under the sin-
gle effluent tax reform. As is evident from Table 10, all three toxic effluents are 
complementary to each other; so too are the air pollutants SO2, NO2, and PART 
(PM-10). Nevertheless, air pollutants (SO2, NO2, VOC, PM-10, and CO) be-  
Table 9. Impact of combined trade and environmental policy reforms on aggregate variables (percentage) 
Combined NAFTA and Environmental Policy Reform
a  Aggregate 
 Variables  BIOAIR  NO2  SO2  CO  VOC  PART 
  (percentage) 
Real GDP  1.44  1.18  1.17  1.33  0.89  1.19 
Production  0.92  -0.86  -0.88  0.58  -1.67  -0.69 
Consumption  2.06  1.15  1.13  2.10  0.29  1.55 
Investment  4.15  2.72  2.68  3.66  1.92  2.74 
Exports  4.77  -0.07  -0.12  2.73  1.29  0.85 
Imports  7.63  2.32  2.28  5.39  4.13  3.43 
Labour Supply  0.91  1.15  1.16  0.89  0.70  1.03 
Capital Supply  1.59  1.07  1.06  1.40  0.91  1.06 
Real Income  2.25  1.37  1.35  2.29  0.17  1.76 
Absorption  1.54  -0.29  -0.31  1.20  -1.40  -0.07 
Table 9. Extended 
Unilateral Trade Integration Combined with Aggregate Abatement of 25 Per Cent by Type of Effluent Emission  Aggregate 
 Variables  TOXAIR  TOXWAT  TOXSOL  BIOAIR  BIOWAT  BIOSOL  SO2  NO2  CO  VOC  PART  BOD  TSS 
   
Real GDP  2.57  2.27  2.59  4.89  -7.09  4.50  4.48  4.49  4.75  4.17  4.50  2.59  4.85 
Production  2.86  2.31  3.02  6.07  -5.69  5.82  2.85  2.90  4.87  2.26  3.09  3.04  6.29 
Consumption  6.98  6.50  7.05  8.67  6.42  8.91  6.99  7.03  8.44  5.99  7.56  7.02  8.92 
Investment  8.88  7.86  9.04  16.43  -22.09  15.43  13.71  13.80  15.19  12.92  13.78  9.07  16.41 
Exports  13.09  12.31  13.18  18.61  1.22  17.29  11.23  11.34  15.41  13.60  12.52  13.15  17.63 
Imports  26.41  25.60  26.40  30.49  11.66  30.03  21.77  21.94  26.70  25.02  23.43  26.34  29.26 
Labour Supply  0.80  0.74  0.82  1.60  -2.57  1.29  2.18  2.12  1.85  1.48  1.98  0.85  1.54 
Capital Supply  3.27  2.86  3.30  6.26  -9.00  5.86  5.33  5.37  5.85  5.25  5.34  3.29  6.24 
Real Income  7.20  6.68  7.26  9.07  6.95  9.33  7.46  7.49  8.88  6.00  8.01  7.24  9.32 
Absorption  4.83  4.19  5.01  8.30  -3.37  8.14  5.00  5.05  7.13  3.90  5.31  5.02  8.54 





















Table 10. Impact of trade and environmental policy reform on national effluent emissions 
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tution effect (along a same isoquant) in each sector has to be consistent under the two tax regimes. The scale effects are different and so are the com-
position effects. For instance in the case of BIOSOL and SO2-NO2, the scale effect of the tax on BIOSOL is more than twice as large as the scale effect 
of the SO2 or NO2 tax, thus reversing the sign of the cross-price impact of a tax on the aggregate level of the other pollutants. 160  BEGHIN ET AL. 
 
come substitutes for toxics and BIOWAT. This substitution is caused by a 
selective increase in pollution, mostly by way of a composition effect. The 
economy specialises in the goods that are cheaper to produce and that induce 
a sharp increase in the untaxed types of pollution. 
In Table 11, the urban health impact of the coordinated reforms reflects 
these substitutions between broad groups of pollutants. Mortality due to air 
pollution increases dramatically under the combined scenarios involving 
toxics and some bio-accumulative pollution because the emissions of PM-10, 
SO2, and NO2 are stimulated. Similarly, the morbidity induced by SO2, NO2, 
PM-10, and CO increases under the same combined scenarios (via the dose-
response functions discussed in Chapter 5). As shown in Table 12, damage 
reductions under coordinated reforms tend to be less substantial than under 
the environmental tax alone because of the substitution forces at work among 
pollutant types. There is one exception. The reform combining free trade and 
the tax on PART (PM-10) induces a sharper decrease in premature mortality 
because free trade allows substitution of natural gas for gasoline at a lower 
relative price than under the PART reform alone. Comparing coordinated 
reforms to the unilateral trade integration, all combined scenarios exhibit 
higher real income levels, inclusive of the health damages. The tax on PM-10 
combined with unilateral trade integration induces net welfare gains, which 
are 16 per cent higher than the net gains under trade integration alone. 
Although the coordinated unilateral trade and environmental policy r e-
forms appear approximately additive in terms of changes in real GDP, trade, 
and consumption, not all scenarios lead to an environmental benefit, and here 
this additivity breaks down (as suggested by Table 12). This result is caused 
by substitution among emissions groups, which are exacerbated when trade 
distortions are removed. A tax on one pollutant group increases emissions of 
another pollutant group and associated health damages. The scenarios involv-
ing unilateral trade integration and a tax on BIOWAT, SO2, NO2, CO, VOC, 
and PART (PM-10) induce an environmental dividend. The other combined 
scenarios do not. All coordinated reforms pay for themselves in the narrow 
sense of the double dividend except the free trade cum BIOWAT tax reform, 
which leads to a negative GDP effect (see Table 9). 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
We analyse trade and environment linkages in the Chilean economy focusing on 
pollution emissions, their impact on urban public health, and natural resource 
based industries. When we consider effluent taxes alone, the abatement of three 
pollutants, SO2, NO2, and PM-10, achieves the largest decrease in both mortality 
and morbidity in Santiago. The health damage reduction exceeds the foregone 
aggregate income and corresponds to a net welfare gain for Chile. 
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Trade integration scenarios offer different outcomes in terms of growth, 
international division of labour, and environmental consequences. Economic 
integration into NAFTA and MERCOSUR is relatively benign to the 
environment, and NAFTA integration has a small pollution elasticity with 
respect to the trade-induced growth. World trade integration via unilateral trade 
liberalisation, with no pollution abatement policy, induces higher growth and 
patterns of specialisation more adverse towards the environment, leading to 
detrimental impacts on public health in Santiago and considerable monetary 
damages associated with health deterioration. 
Coordinated scenarios are well grounded in economic theory and represent 
the best of both worlds (efficiency gains from trade and protected environment). 
They are characterised by economic expansion and decreases in the emissions of 
the targeted pollutant as well as its polluting “complements.” Nevertheless, 
emissions of untaxed substitute pollutants increase considerably. These strong 
substitutions have a negative impact on urban health, with notable increases in 
mortality and morbidity when toxic and bio-accumulative pollutants are the tar-
gets. Further, several natural resource based sectors expand as well, therefore 
increasing the dimensionality of policy coordination (e.g., trade policy, effluent 
taxes, natural resource management). This is a result specific to our investigation 
of Chile. By contrast, our investigation of Mexico suggests mostly complemen-
tarity between effluent types (see the summary in Chapter 10).  
Another regularity shared by this country case study and the other ones 
included in this book is the relatively low cost of pollution abatement in terms of 
foregone aggregate income. In the specific case of Chile and Santiago, we 
establish this result in terms of welfare. The monetary damages equivalent to the 
health impact of air  pollution are greatly reduced by environmental taxes, 
especially by the tax on PM-10, NO2, and SO2, such that the these welfare gains 
exceed the loss of GDP induced by the taxes. A net welfare gain emerges. This 
statement has to be qualified because the resource reallocation implied by the 
effluent taxes is substantial on a sectoral base and we do abstract from explicit 
adjustment cost. 
The observed substitutability among pollutant types raises two additional 
coordination and targeting issues. The first one is the coordination of 
environmental programs targeting subgroups of pollutants (e.g., toxic, bio-
accumulative, and air criteria pollutants). Given the substantial substitutability 
between these groups, an integrated approach to environmental reform 
encompassing all major groups of pollutants appears appropriate to avoid 
unintended environmental degradation. The other interesting point is the hopeful 
observation that strong complementarities also exist within some groups of 
pollutants and that a policy targeting any pollutant within a group would achieve 
substantial abatement in most emission types included in that group.    CHILE  165 
 
 
   
NOTES 
1 See van der Mensbrugghe et al. 1998 and Beghin et al. 2001. The first study was initiated in 1996. 
The second study was initially conducted in 1997 but then was extensively updated in the summer 
of 2000 because a new pollution inventory became available for Santiago. We also accounted for 
decreased lead emissions due to new regulation in place in Chile. A few unit values used for the 
health valuation presented in Chapter 5 were updated as well because better information became 
available. Earlier and updated results produced similar stylised stories, however. 
2   According to Penn World Tables (Summers and Heston 1991), real income per capita grew 1.68 
per cent annually from 1950 to 1973. In the decade following the crisis of 1973-75, the average 
real income per capita grew erratically, at the average rate of 1.53 per cent per year. Since 1985, 
real income per capita has been growing at 5.02 per cent a year. According to the International 
Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics, real GDP grew at an annual rate of 7.68 per 
cent during the 1990s.  
3    For example, total suspended particulates and respirable particulates (PM-10), ozone, and carbon 
monoxide (CO) concentrations in Santiago are in excess of established standards for several 
months every year (The World Bank 1994). The one-year average concentration of PM-10 was 
estimated at 108.7 micrograms per cubic metre (mg/m3) in Santiago in 1992 and at 87.85mg/m3 in 
1997. 166  BEGHIN ET AL. 
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